With the growing complexity of, and reliance on, safety-related electrical/electronic (E/E) systems in the automotive sector, the development of an explicit safety case is highly recommended to provide assurance to the different stakeholders interested in automotive functional safety. The production of a safety case is explicitly mandated by the draft automotive functional safety standard ISO26262. A safety case should consider all organisational and technical factors that may contribute to safety. For example, it should provide assurance for the safe behaviours of a particular system as well as assurance for the process by which this system is developed, operated and maintained. In this paper, we address one component of the overall safety case, namely the assurance of the functional safety concept. In particular, we examine how model-driven development and assessment can provide a basis for the systematic generation of functional safety requirements. We demonstrate how an automotive safety case can be structurally and traceably developed, justifying why and how the defined functional safety requirements can adequately mitigate the risk of the identified hazards to an acceptable level. A case study is also presented throughout this paper, discussing examples and lessons learnt from the development of a safety case for an air suspension system.
INTRODUCTION
Providing assurance for safety lies at the heart of a safety management system. This assurance can be implicit, through compliance with a safety process as prescribed within a particular safety standard. In contrast, this assurance can be explicit, communicated by means of a clear safety case. A safety case presents an argument, supported by evidence, that the system is acceptably safe to operate in a given environment. A safety case should consider all organisational and technical factors that may contribute to safety. For example, it should provide assurance for the safe behaviours of a particular system as well as assurance for the process by which this system is developed, operated and maintained. In the automotive sector, safety case development is increasingly being adopted, partly due to the growing complexity of, and reliance on, E/E systems to perform safety-related functions. The production of a safety case is explicitly mandated by the draft automotive functional safety standard ISO26262 (DIS ISO26262-2 6.5.3) [1] .
In this paper, we examine how a safety case can be developed for the assurance of the functional safety concept for an automotive E/E system. The objective of the functional safety concept, as described in the draft ISO26262, is to define a set of functional safety requirements which together satisfy all the safety goals associated with the hazards determined during hazard analysis and risk assessment [1] . The functional safety concept includes fault detection and failure mitigation, transitioning to a safe state, fault tolerance mechanisms, driver warnings and arbitration logic [1] . In particular, we examine how a model-driven approach can provide a basis for the systematic generation of the functional safety requirements considered in the safety case. We also explore and evaluate how traceability between the design models and safety analyses can be enhanced by means of explicit integration between the safety case, represented in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [3] , and the system models, represented in the Systems Modelling Language (SysML) [2] .
A case study is presented throughout this paper, discussing examples from the development of a preliminary safety case for a 4-corner air suspension system 1 . The two main functions of this system are to maintain a level vehicle at the target ride height and to allow changes in target vehicle ride height. These changes may either occur automatically as a result of constraints in vehicle speed or as a direct request from the driver using the controls provided.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model-based approach considered in this paper, briefly discussing the graphical notations used throughout the paper. The top-level safety argument for the air suspension system is then presented, showing how it relates to contextual and system models. Next, we present a fault mitigation argument, demonstrating the adequacy of the functional safety concept to address certain hazardous conditions. The process perspective of assurance is then discussed by describing a process-based safety argument. Finally, a number of conclusions are presented.
MODEL-BASED APPROACH TO FUNCTIONAL SAFETY ASSURANCE
Achieving integration between functional and behavioural design and safety analysis is essential for the development of safety-critical systems. This is mainly because safety is a consequential attribute; i.e. safety conditions such as hazards and failure modes are often an outcome of certain unintended system functionalities and behaviours in a given environment. When safety assessment results, such as failure modes and safety requirements, are generated for a system function, it is necessary to trace these results explicitly to the design specifications, including all relevant environmental assumptions, concerning that function. This is why system hazards are typically identified given the safety analysts' understanding of the system and its environment. For example, safety modes are often stated given certain assumptions about data sampling rates, levels of independence, expected operation modes, maintenance procedures and end-user competencies. In this paper, we consider how model-based engineering can enhance integration between design and safety assurance, specifically for automotive applications. In particular, we consider two graphical notations: SysML and GSN. Both SysML and GSN produce graphical representations in a modular and hierarchical way. In particular, modularity helps in handling the complexity of the system representation and safety argument by supporting the creation of smaller chunks of information that are scalable and manageable.
THE SYSTEMS MODELING LANGUAGE (SYSML)
Companies which produce complex safety-critical systems are increasingly adopting model-based approaches to the development, assessment and assurance of E/E systems. This is best exemplified by the growing interest in SysML [2] , particularly in its role in the description and analysis of systems requirements and design architectures. SysML, which is partly based on the Unified Modelling Language (UML), offers graphical means for modelling the structural and behavioural aspects of systems through a set of syntactically-defined diagrams (Figure 1 ). These diagrams are particularly useful for the documentation of early-lifecycle artefacts such as requirements and design specifications. For example, use case diagrams, often used for requirements specification, capture a particular usage of the system and the way in which the system should interact with its environment. Conversely, block definition diagrams, normally used for architectural design definition, describe the modular units of a system, e.g. control or monitoring units. The behaviours associated with these blocks are typically described using a set of activity diagrams. Collectively, these diagrams provide an integrated description of the system, depicted from the behavioural as well as from the structural perspectives. 
THE GOAL STRUCTURING NOTATION (GSN)
Recently, there has been a marked shift towards safety standards that recommend or mandate the development and management of well-structured and well-reasoned safety arguments. To effectively develop such arguments, the safety sector is increasingly adopting graphical modelling notations for the representation of safety arguments. This is partly because of the capability of graphical argumentation notations such as GSN to address the difficulty of communicating and maintaining complex safety arguments described in free text [3] . GSN represents safety arguments in terms of basic elements such as goals, solutions, and strategies ( Figure 2 ). Arguments are created in GSN by linking these elements using two main relationships, 'supported by' and 'in context of' to form a goal structure. The principal purpose of any goal structure is to show how goals (claims about the system) are successively broken down into sub-goals until a point is reached where claims can be supported by direct reference to available evidence (solutions). As part of this decomposition, using the GSN it is also possible to make clear the argument strategies adopted (e.g. adopting a quantitative or qualitative approach), the rationale for the approach and the context in which goals are stated (e.g. the system scope or the assumed operational role). To address the complexity of certain safety arguments, GSN supports the decomposition of safety arguments into a number of modules (i.e. argument modules), which reference one another by means of Away Goals. This approach is often referred to as 'modular safety cases' [4] . 
OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
As previously mentioned, this paper targets the justification of the functional safety concept for automotive E/E systems. In particular, we address the justification of the functional safety concept by explicitly representing a safety argument which considers the adequacy of the functional safety requirements in mitigating the risk of the identified system hazards. This safety argument is modelled in GSN and is traced to a set of contextual and system models, defined in SysML (Figure 3 ). These SysML models describe the environment within which the system is deployed, the functions provided by the systems, the modular units comprising the system and the behaviours exhibited by the system. These models provide the basis upon which the hazard analysis and risk assessment activities are carried out. Further, these models provide the basis upon which the functional safety concept is defined by showing the fault mitigation mechanisms deployed to reduce the risks of the identified hazards. Most of these SysML models of the environment and the system, particularly those specifying the fault mitigation behaviours of the system, are referenced in the safety argument, maintaining a traceable link between the safety assessment artefacts and the SysML models. In the next sections, we describe this model-based approach to functional safety assurance by discussing examples and lessons learnt from the development of a safety case for an air suspension system. We first describe the top-level argument which addresses a set of identified hazards and how they relate to system functions within a particular environment. We then describe the structure of the arguments addressing the risk of each identified hazard by means of explicit mitigation measures, described in a set of SysML diagrams. Figure 4 shows the top-level safety argument for the air suspension system. The top-level goal is a claim that all due diligence has been performed. This is achieved by adopting industry best practice as defined in the relevant functional safety standard, ISO 26262. The standard is hazard directed and "uses ASILs [Automotive Safety Integrity Levels] for specifying the item's necessary safety requirements for achieving an acceptable residual risk" [1] . Therefore this argument is hazard-and risk-directed. That is, the argument explicitly addresses the risk of each identified hazard, showing that each risk is acceptable. Hazards associated with the air suspension system are identified by considering the potential effects of the system's operation, and non-operation, in a variety of different user situations. It is important to note that this safety argument is described in the context of an explicit definition of the system and its environment ('AirSus_Def', 'AirSus_Env' and 'C_Safety_Envelope'). This definition is referred to as 'Item Definition' in the Draft ISO26262 (DIS ISO26262-3 5.5). The item definition for the air suspension system considered in this paper is described in terms of a number of SysML models, namely:
HAZARD-AND RISK-DIRECTED SAFETY ARGUMENT
 Context and feature models: described in block definition and internal block definition diagrams  System requirements models: described in use case diagrams (mainly high-level functionality)  System structure: described in block definition and internal block definition diagrams  System behaviours: described in activity diagrams
In the next subsections, we briefly discuss these models and how they are linked to the safety conditions considered within the safety argument. 
CONTEXT AND FEATURE MODELS
The context model defines factors in the environment of the air suspension system with which the system interacts. These factors are grouped in a number of packages, addressing:
 Vehicle characteristics such as vehicle load and body type (pkg Vehicle)  Peer systems such as those providing ignition status and vehicle speed (pkg OtherSystems)  Vehicle support covering maintenance and service (pkg Support)  Physical environment such as road and obstacle types (pkg PhysicalEnvironment)  Actors specifying persons affected by the system such as drivers, passengers and maintenance personnel (pkg Actors)
Further, this context model specifies which contextual factors are core, i.e. common to all system variants, and which are optional. These factors play a key role in constraining the scope of the safety case (e.g. the 'AirSus_Env' context element in Figure 4 ). An example of how these contextual factors were specified for vehicle characteristics (pkg Vehicle) is shown in Figure 5 . The feature model of the air suspension system specifies the system's core and optional functions and operating states. Figure 6 shows an extract from the feature model, showing the different ways in which the target ride height may change. For example, it shows that a change of the vehicle height can be initiated automatically by the vehicle (core), manually by the maintenance team (core) or manually by the driver (optional, depending on the vehicle type). 
FUNCTIONAL, STRUCTURAL AND BEHAVIOURAL SYSTEM MODELS
The system definition is specified in terms of various SysML models describing the functional, structural and behavioural characteristics of the system. In particular, the following models are generated:
 Use Case Models: describing system functions captured in the feature model and how they relate to one another and to their context  Block Definition and Internal Block Definition Models: describing the main components and communications in the system  Activity Diagrams: describing nominal and fault management behaviours of the system, detailing the behaviour of each function under normal and impaired conditions.
The main functionality of the air suspension system is to maintain and change the target ride height under all rated vehicle operating conditions. This functionality is provided by controlling the quantity of air in the air springs at all four corners of the vehicle in response to the signals from sensors that measure the suspension height at each wheel. This functionality is described in Figure 7 in a SysML use case diagram. For example, the use case ' Change target ride height' specifies a particular function of the air suspension system which allows the driver to request several height settings for different driving conditions. Several different ride heights are requested automatically for different operating conditions (including special conditions to assist in special operations such as maintenance and transport). The use case diagram also shows how this function relates to the system's environment by linking the use case ' Change target ride height' to external factors such as 'Door status', 'Terrain response' and 'Road prompts'. All of these factors are captured in the context model introduced in the previous section (ensuring explicit model-based traceability between the system functions and the environment within which these functions can be used).
Fig. 7. SysML Use Case Diagram
The detailed behaviours associated with each function captured in the use case diagram are specified using a SysML activity diagram. For example, Figure 8 shows an activity diagram detailing the system behaviours associated with the 'Deliver height' function. This activity diagram describes two key operational behaviours related to raising and lowering the vehicle based on several inputs such as 'Vehicle speed', ' Lateral acceleration' and 'Door status' (all of which trace to the context model). In short, the top-level safety argument in figure 4 addresses the risk of system hazards as identified with reference to the item definition described in SysML diagrams. This safety argument presents a set of claims regarding the acceptability of the risk associated with each system hazard. In this argument, each of these claims is encapsulated within a separate argument module which presents an argument supporting the claim about the risk mitigation of the hazard. For example, the claim about the risk of trap is described in an Away Goal which is supported by an argument encapsulated in the 'Trap Hazard Argument' module (illustrated separately in Figure 9 ). The type of arguments encapsulated in these modules support the claim concerning the acceptability of the hazard risk by appealing to the adequacy of the functional safety concept to reduce the risk of the hazard to an acceptable level. This is discussed in further detail in the next section. 
RISK MITIGATION SAFETY ARGUMENT
In this section, we discuss the structure of the argument addressing the claim regarding the acceptability of the risk associated with a particular hazard by appealing to the adequacy of the functional safety concept. The structure of the argument is depicted in Figure 10 (the name of the hazard and certain failure conditions were removed for reasons of commercial sensitivity). The argument shows that the risk has been adequately managed in accordance with the ASIL defined for that risk. This argument justifies the defined risk classification against the ISO26262 ASIL scheme, based on the estimated severity, probability of exposure and controllability of each hazard. Based on the ASIL associated with the risk, the argument justifies that the risk has been managed by eliminating causes of the hazard considered by that risk. Where there are faults which can impair the elimination of these hazard causes, the argument addresses these faults by showing how fault-mitigation measures have been defined to keep the vehicle in an acceptably safe state in presence of these faults.
Fig. 10. Hazard Argument Module
For the air suspension system, the initial SysML models were analysed to determine how system failures could lead to the hazards. The required fault management behaviours, necessary to mitigate all the hazards, were subsequently determined. These fault management behaviours were also captured in Activity diagrams. In ISO26262 terms, the set of fault management behaviours constitute the functional safety concept which was documented as a set of functional safety requirements, traceable to both the nominal and fault management Activity diagrams.
Three forms of fault-mitigation measure are considered in the safety argument of the air suspension system, namely:
 Lowering the vehicle to an acceptably safe height -the choice of this height depends on factors such as the detection of certain faults and previous vehicle height and speed  Disabling all requests for a vehicle height change -this includes automatic and manual requests  Warning the driver of a fault -different types of warnings are used, mainly depending on the critically of the faults and the different configurations of the driver interface, e.g. choice of optional features supporting textual messages in addition to core driver interface features such as warning lamps and chimes.
For instance, the mitigation of the failure condition caused by the inability to measure corner heights ('Vehicle_height_indeterminate') is described in the Activity diagram shown in Figure 11 . This Activity diagram shows that, upon the detection of the inability to measure corner heights or control pressure, the system lowers the vehicle to the bump-stops height, disables height changes and informs the driver of a fault. The argument within the air suspension system safety case corresponding to this fault mitigation behaviour is shown in Figure 12 (contained within the argument module supporting the claim 'Vehicle_height_indeterminate' previously included in Figure 10 ). 
PROCESS-BASED SAFETY ARGUMENT
Finally, the air suspension system safety case includes an argument module addressing the assurance of the hazard identification and risk assessment process ('Hazard Analysis Process Argument'). This argument is referenced in Figure 4 by the 'Top-Level Argument', specifically through the 'Ident_Haz' context element referencing the away goal 'IdentHazards'. The objective of this association is to justify the process by which system hazards have been identified and analysed. The argument presented within the 'Hazard Analysis Process Argument' module, depicted in Figure 13 , provides assurance about the hazard analysis process by addressing compliance with the ISO26262 guidance regarding hazard identification, hazard classification and ASIL determination. The argument also justifies the competency of the team responsible for carrying out this process. Further, there are cases where the classification of certain hazards cannot be determined merely based on expert judgment. In these cases, and in order to mitigate the potential for under-classification of these hazards, additional vehicle tests are required in order to confirm certain assumptions concerning the controllability, probability of exposure or severity of these hazards ('Underclass').
The argument depicted in Figure 13 is typically referred to as process-based argument [7] . In the previous sections, we emphasised the fundamental role of the safety case for assuring the safety of the system itself. In particular, we focused on one particular type of safety argument, namely product-based arguments. Productbased arguments address safety assurance by arguing over the acceptable safe behaviours of the system, targeting, for example, claims concerning the tolerability of the risks of all identified hazards and the satisfaction of all defined safety requirements. These claims are then substantiated by direct evidence generated from analysis, testing, simulation and in-service history. However, confidence in the safety of the system may be undermined by uncertainties about the provenance of the product-based evidence. The trustworthiness of this type of evidence depends on the quality of the underlying engineering process (i.e. the simple question: why should I trust the evidence?). Process elements such as competency of personnel, reliability of tools, suitability of notations and soundness of methods constitute key criteria against which the trustworthiness of productbased evidence can be determined. Disregarded weaknesses and flaws in these process elements may propagate into the safety-critical system itself. The process can fail to deliver its expected outputs and consequently weaken confidence in the safety of the system.
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Fig. 13. Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment Process-Based Argument
A process-based argument like the one depicted in Figure 13 is often called a backing argument as it is used to show that the direct, product-based evidence is "both credible and soundly based" [5] . Process-based evidence is typically generated based on two main criteria [6] :
 Compliance with nationally and internationally recognised standards which are relevant to the domain and criticality of the system  Selection of established techniques and tools and employment of competent technical and managerial personnel, e.g. selection of qualified modelling tools or programming language safe subsets.
Eventually, the complete safety case should address all organisational and technical factors that may contribute, to safety such as product design, development, deployment, operation and maintenance as well as organisational maintenance of an adequate level of safety culture. From the draft ISO26262 perspective, the complete safety case should address product factors such as the functional and technical concepts as well as process factors such as safety management and quality assurance (illustrated in Figure 14) . 
SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS
In this section, we present an evaluation of the process and outcomes of the model-based assurance approach presented in the previous sections, focusing on lessons learnt from the development of the SysML models and safety case for the air suspension system.
DEFINITION OF CONTEXT AND FEATURE MODELS
A key advantage for creating the air suspension system's context and feature models was the explicit documentation of expert domain knowledge. Engineers were able to air their views, agreeing or disagreeing with, or suggesting a different way for, the inclusion, exclusion or categorisation of certain contextual factors or system features. Further, because these models capture permitted variations, decisions as to which elements are core and which are optional were easier to make and evaluate (and even revaluate whenever new information had been uncovered). The context model was instrumental in contextualising the air suspension system safety case, explicitly highlighting environmental factors and vehicle characteristics which allow system failures to become hazards. These factors and characteristics were clearly referenced in the safety case. Finally, as a positive side-effect, the air suspension system's context and feature models were useful for creating additional diagrams for usages beyond safety analysis. For example, based on the context and feature models, a P-diagram was created to analyse the completeness of identified input-output transformations (typically used for robustness analysis).
SYSTEM MODELLING IN SYSML
System models were created in order to document the structural and behavioural aspects of the system functions defined in the feature model. More specifically, the behaviours of these functions were defined given specific assumptions about the system's environment as captured in the context model. The most useful diagrams used in this industrial application, as far as safety assurance is concerned, were the SysML activity diagrams. These diagrams helped in specifying the nominal and fault management behaviours of the system, which informed the creation and analysis of the system's functional safety requirements. These functional safety requirements were a main input to the development of the safety case, showing how the system, through the achievement of these requirements, can eliminate or mitigate causes of the identified system hazards. Where there were uncertainties about the assumed behaviours of certain functions, as uncovered by the SysML activity diagrams, further analysis and vehicle tests were required to confirm these behaviours. The fault management behaviours captured in the activity diagrams played a fundamental role in ensuring sufficient coverage of how the system reacts in the event of deviations from the nominal behaviours of the system.
Because of the complexity of the behavioural aspects of system functions and their relationships with one another and with their environment, in addition to how these behaviours trace to the safety case, further work is still required to examine how 'sophisticated' modelling tools, such as those offering model merging, querying, transformation and composition, can support the process of managing the context, feature, system and safety case models and their interdependencies. Specifically for the air suspension system case study, Microsoft Visio worked well as far as the creation of a limited number of models was concerned. However, by the end of this case study, around 70 models were created (covering the system's context, feature, system and safety case definitions), making the manual traceability of the different concerns addressed by these models unreasonably time-consuming. This was exacerbated by the fact that these models included system variations, the impact of which can vary depending on the way in which these variations can be instantiated within different types of environments, e.g. different vehicle usages, body types and interface characteristics. In short, tool-support is essential for specifying and enforcing invariants and constraints which are needed for ensuring explicit traceability between the different models created in this pilot industrial application. Further, the case for toolsupport becomes more urgent once a decision is made to extend this work to cover the technical safety concept (e.g. low-level design), i.e. adding an extra layer of complexity in the relationships between the product line's context, system and safety case models.
In general, the ability to represent different technologies, e.g. electrical, pneumatic and mechanical, with a single notation such as SysML was an improvement on the previous situation where each technology used a different notation. The use of a notation with defined syntax meant that the diagrams could easily be understood by those who were not involved with their creation, e.g. independent reviewers.
SAFETY CASE
The definition of well-structured and traceable context, feature and system models paved the way for the development of the safety case. The relationship between the safety case and the context, feature and system models was bidirectional. The safety case was a driver for further information that needed to be part of the context and system models, e.g. assumptions that needed to be made in the safety case which had no explicit links with the system or context models. The safety case changed and evolved as more information was captured in the context, feature and system models. Also, the following issues were identified and clarified as a result of the need to define an explicit and traceable safety argument:
 Terminology ambiguities  Need to make a clear distinction between different types of driver warnings  Overlaps between the definition of certain fault types in the context and system models Regarding compliance with ISO26262, the safety case prompted the reassessment of hazard classifications in order to be compatible with the ISO26262 classification scheme. Further, the development of the safety case was an attempt to show how a safety case can be developed in light of the draft ISO26262 functional safety concept guidance. In particular, this case study provided a model-based assurance interpretation of that guidance by showing how SysML models can be used to analyse an explicit definition of an automotive item which is traceable to the item's safety case.
Finally, the safety argument presented in the 'Top-Level Argument' (Figure 4) is stated within the context of the identified hazards ('Ident_Haz'). The validity of this context element is central to the assurance of this argument. To this end, a process-based argument was attached to that context element to justify the adequacy of the hazard analysis process, through the away goal 'IdentHazards'. This process-based argument, encapsulated in the 'Hazard Analysis Process Argument' module (discussed in the previous section), justifies the adequacy of hazard analysis by arguing over compliance with ISO26262 guidance and management of process weaknesses. This interaction between product-based and process-based arguments highlighted the importance of processbased arguments, as a form of a backing argument, in justifying certain contextual assumptions stated within the product-based argument.
